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‘Say on pay’ is an important element of shareholder democracy and has been the topic of a 
growing body of academic literature in recent years (Cai & Walkling 2011; Conyon & Sadler 2010; 
Goranova & Ryan 2014). ‘Say on pay’ is a legal term that refers to the rights of ordinary 
shareholders to influence the executive remuneration policies and practices of the companies in 
which they invest (henceforth called ‘investee companies’) (Cai & Walkling 2011). Evidence in 
the United States (US) suggests that shareholders had raised their concerns regarding seemingly 
excessive executive remuneration as far back as 1933 (Marens 2002). Interest in the topic surged 
post-2008 as many stakeholders believed that the structure of executives’ emolument packages 
contributed to the global financial crisis (Bhagat & Bolton 2014; Faulkender et al. 2010).
‘Say on pay’ is not only a phenomenon that occurs elsewhere in the world. Shareholders in 
South Africa have also joined this social movement which encourages fair and responsible 
executive remuneration (Viviers 2015). Although the country celebrates 25 years of democracy in 
2019, the sad reality is that economic freedom remains beyond the grasp of many ordinary citizens. 
According to a 2017 survey published by Statistics South Africa, poverty levels in the country 
have risen sharply after the 2010 recession. In 2015, more than half of the population (55.5%) was 
categorised as ‘poor’ (Statistics South Africa 2017). South Africa also has one of the highest wage 
gaps in the world (Statistics South Africa 2017). It reflects the difference between the remuneration 
received by the highest paid employee in a company, usually the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
the lowest paid employee. The wage gap of locally listed companies increased from 61.8 times in 
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2017 to 64.7 times in 2018 (PwC 2018). This large and growing 
wage differential contributes to South Africa having the 
highest level of income inequality in the world (The World 
Bank in South Africa 2018). Discontent is subsequently rising 
among shareholders about remuneration at the highest 
corporate echelons, notably excessive CEO pay (Ertimur, 
Ferri & Muslu 2011; Kimbro & Zu 2016).
In addition to social movement theory (Reid & Toffel 2009), 
previous scholars have used various other theoretical 
foundations to address the multidimensional nature of 
shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan 2014). The agency 
theory is deemed the primary theoretical lens in activism 
literature (Goranova & Ryan 2014). This theory is also tied to 
executive remuneration literature, suggesting that managers 
should be incentivised to maximise shareholder value 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Some shareholder activists express 
dissatisfaction with the disconnect between performance 
and emolument and demand that remuneration policies be 
amended (Goranova & Ryan 2014). Pay-performance 
sensitivity is dependent on achieving a so-called ‘optimal 
contract’ to attract and appropriately incentivise talented 
executives (Bussin 2015a).
Local companies often justify their generous pay packages to 
executives by citing the intense competition to attract and 
retain skilled executives from a limited talent pool (Bussin 
2018; Madlela & Cassim 2017). Although this claim may be 
valid in some cases, fundamental questions regarding social 
justice remain. The wage gap can be addressed from both 
ends of the pay scale. Whereas trade unions can negotiate 
higher wages for the lowest paid individuals (Banning & 
Chiles 2007), shareholders can influence the size and 
composition of executives’ pay packages (Conyon & Sadler 
2010), albeit through a non-binding vote.
The emergent voice among South African shareholders and 
other stakeholders (collectively called ‘challengers’) might be 
ascribed to a number of events including the Marikana 
massacre. This tragic incident, which occurred in August 
2012, is seen by some as a turning point in South African 
history. Alexander (2013:605) posits that this event initiated a 
‘massive wave of strikes which are changing [the] structures 
that shape people’s lives’. In addition, the surge in civilian 
and student protests in recent years (Bohler-Muller et al. 
2017) might have emboldened social-minded activists to add 
their voices to the debate on what constitutes fair and 
responsible executive remuneration (Keke 2017). Although 
protests can highlight pressing issues, they should occur in 
an organised, controlled manner. Ideally, messages should be 
conveyed with minimal disruption to the economy.
A number of public and private voice mechanisms are 
available to shareholder activists to hold managers 
accountable and bring about change in investee companies 
(Yocam & Choi 2010). Private voice mechanisms comprise 
confidential correspondence and negotiations with investee 
companies, whereas public voice mechanisms include the 
filing of shareholder resolutions, voting, asking questions at 
shareholder meetings and raising concerns in the traditional 
and social media (Viviers 2015). Proxy contests and legal 
proceedings to enforce shareholder rights could also be 
regarded as formal voice strategies (Viviers 2015). Most prior 
studies have investigated the effectiveness of ‘say on pay’ 
resolutions and voting in the US and the United Kingdom 
(UK) (Conyon & Sadler 2010; Del Guercio, Seery & Woidtke 
2008). Few studies have been conducted internationally on 
public opinion and the ‘power of the pen’ in transforming 
executive remuneration policies and practices (Core, Guay & 
Larcker 2008; Hooghiemstra, Kuang & Qin 2015; Kuhnen & 
Niessen 2012).
Most of the studies that have been conducted on executive 
remuneration in South Africa have centred on the 
relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance (Bussin & Blair 2015; Bussin & Modau 2015; 
Bussin & Nel 2015; Bradley 2013; Deysel & Kruger 2015; 
De Wet 2012; Scholtz & Smit 2012). Other scholars have 
investigated the factors influencing remuneration policies 
such as pay benchmarking (Oberholzer & Theunissen 2012) 
and the retention of talented staff, especially black executives 
(Nzukuma & Bussin 2011). Limited research has been 
conducted on the influence that shareholders could have on 
shaping executive remuneration policies and practices 
(Madlela & Cassim 2017; Viviers 2015).
In light of the research gap, the authors formulated four 
research objectives, namely to investigate the nature of the 
South African entities that were publicly criticised for their 
executive remuneration policies and practices, to identify 
the main challengers in this social movement, to highlight 
the key issues they raised, and to determine the impact 
that challengers had on the targeted entities’ executive 
remuneration. The study covered five state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and 38 companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period 2010–2016. If 
shareholders and other stakeholders realise that their actions 
can democratise executive remuneration in South Africa, 
more of them might be encouraged to speak out in public.
In the following section, pertinent literature will be discussed 
on the nature of the entities that are typically targeted and the 
challengers who participate in this social movement. Attention 
is also given to the executive remuneration-related issues 
raised by the challengers and studies outlining the effectiveness 
of shareholder activists as change agents. Next, the methods 
used to collect and analyse secondary quantitative data are 
presented. This is followed by the main findings and 
conclusions along with recommendations for remuneration 
committees, academics and ‘say on pay’ challengers.
The nature of entities being 
targeted
Although several international scholars found that large 
companies and those with poor financial performance are 
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targeted the most (Cai & Walkling 2011; Ertimur et al. 2011; 
Goranova & Ryan 2014), no evidence in this regard could 
be established locally (Viviers & Smit 2015). Companies 
that were excluded from the FTSE/JSE Responsible 
Investment (RI) Index in 2013 attracted significantly more 
‘against’ votes than their counterparts that were included. 
Listed South African companies that recorded low 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure 
scores, as computed by Bloomberg, also received several 
‘against’ votes (Viviers & Smit 2015). Barko, Cremers and 
Renneboog (2018) likewise established that US companies 
with low ESG ratings were more likely to be targeted. These 
targets typically had a high market share, enjoyed 
considerable analyst coverage, had high stock returns and 
were frequently traded. Engagements often resulted in ESG 
rating being adjusted (Barko et al. 2018).
Challengers in the ‘say on pay’ 
movement
As large institutional investors own the majority of listed 
shares globally, they have a responsibility to monitor corporate 
behaviour and intervene where deemed necessary (Goranova 
& Ryan 2014). These powerful financial intermediaries tend to 
be better informed, have easier access to investee companies’ 
boardrooms and have more clout to drive institutional change 
than individual and minority shareholders (Gifford 2010; 
Schnatterly, Shaw & Jennings 2008). As elsewhere in the 
world, institutional investors in South Africa prefer to engage 
behind closed doors (Yamahaki & Frynas 2016). The term 
‘institutional investor’ refers to asset owners, such as pension 
funds and insurance companies, and the asset managers who 
are appointed to act on their behalf. The authors acknowledge 
that asset owners could provide debt and equity financing to 
investee companies. The focus in this article is, however, only 
on asset owners’ role as shareholders.
In large markets, shareholder activists can use an exit 
(divestment) strategy. If a shareholder sells a significant 
stake in an investee company and announces this decision 
publicly, a clear message is sent to management. In addition, 
a publicly announced divestment can considerably influence 
the target company’s market valuation (Gillan & Starks 
2000; Stathopoulos & Voulgaris 2016). An exit strategy 
might, however, go unnoticed when a shareholder divests 
without informing the market of the reasons for doing so. As 
South Africa has a relatively small stock market, very few 
shareholders have used this strategy (Viviers & Smit 2015).
Minority shareholders and other challengers, such as trade 
unions and non-governmental organisations, often find it 
difficult to secure private meetings with investee companies. 
As a result, they are limited to asking questions at shareholder 
meetings and raising their concerns in the press. By ‘airing a 
company’s dirty laundry’ in public, these challengers often 
succeed in obtaining swift responses to their questions and 
transformation requests (Viviers, Mans-Kemp & Fawcett 
2017). It should be noted that minority shareholders enjoy 
extensive legal protection in South Africa. The Companies Act 
(No. 71 of 2008) even enables them to bring a class action suit 
against an investee company.
Research conducted by Gantchev (2013) and Stathopoulos 
and Voulgaris (2016) shows that, as societies are becoming 
more justice-oriented, more expressions of public discontent 
are being observed. Nowhere is this public discontent 
more prevalent than in relation to executive remuneration 
(Davids & Ntamane 2017). The controversy has even been 
described as being at ‘the cutting edge of the [US] 
shareholder spring’ (Corkery & Medarevic 2013).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there has been a notable 
increase in the number of companies that received a large 
percentage of ‘no’ votes on their remuneration policies since 
the publication of the King IV report. Compared to earlier 
versions of the report, King IV introduced more principled 
guidelines on the structure, approval and disclosure of 
executive remuneration policies and practices. Boards 
should ensure that executive emolument is fair and 
responsible in the context of overall employee compensation 
and are obliged to engage with shareholders should the 
remuneration policy attract more than 25% opposing votes 
(Institute of Directors in Southern Africa [IODSA] 2016). 
Research shows that few opposing votes were cast at local 
investee companies in the past (Viviers & Smit 2015). 
Examples in this regard include MTN Group, Old Mutual 
and ABSA Group (Mchunu 2019).
Theoretical link between shareholder 
activism and executive emolument
The agency theory is the primary theoretical lens in activism 
literature (Goranova & Ryan 2014). There are different views 
on the agency theory when applied to executive remuneration-
related activism. Remuneration could arguably be used 
to align executives’ interests with those of shareholders, by 
designing contracts that reward superior performance 
(Bussin 2015a; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Carefully structured 
executive pay packages could provide a potential solution to 
the agency problem and diminish agency costs (Bebchuk & 
Fried 2006; Devers et al. 2007).
Substantial bonuses that are unjustified, however, have 
the potential to considerably reduce shareholders’ wealth 
(Bebchuk & Fried 2006). Remuneration committees are 
criticised for increasing CEO compensation despite poor 
financial results (Bussin 2015a). A prominent driver of 
shareholder activism is the lack of financial performance at 
investee companies (Goranova & Ryan 2014). The perceived 
misalignment between a company’s financial performance 
and executive pay furthermore provokes discontent 
among shareholders, as it represents a lost opportunity to 
alleviate the agency problem (Cai & Walkling 2011; Ertimur 
et al. 2011). Incentive-based compensation thus necessitates 
enhanced monitoring by directors and shareholders 
(Goranova & Ryan 2014).
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The need for greater alignment between executive 
remuneration and company performance gave rise to the 
optimal contracting theory (Bussin 2015a). Based on this 
theory, remuneration committees often defend seemingly 
excessive executive remuneration packages given the need to 
attract and retain highly qualified individuals from a limited 
talent pool (Edmans & Gabaix 2009). Advocates of this theory 
seek to achieve greater pay-performance sensitivity (Bussin 
2015a). Managerial power is an alternative theory related to 
the drivers of executive compensation (Bussin 2015a). This 
theory suggests that executives could benefit from large pay 
packages, as they could partly influence the structure of their 
packages (Bebchuk & Fried 2003; Edmans & Gabaix 2009). 
Given executives’ negotiation power, the remuneration 
committee could be forced to serve their best interests (Bussin 
2015a). Executives could subsequently receive rewards that 
are less than optimal from a shareholder’s perspective 
(Bussin 2015b). As managerial power could contribute to 
the agency problem (Bebchuk & Fried 2003), shareholder 
monitoring and engagement are essential (Bussin 2015b).
Most engagements on the topic relate to the misalignment 
between company performance and executive pay (Bussin 
2015a; Cai & Walkling 2011; Ferri & Sandino 2009). Not only 
did activists question the size of executives’ remuneration 
packages, but they also requested more information about 
the metrics that were being used to evaluate and reward 
these individuals’ performance (Conyon & Sadler 2010; 
Liu & Taylor 2008). Scholars attribute the high level of 
discontent to shareholders observing ‘a lost opportunity to 
alleviate the agency problem’ (Goranova & Ryan 2014:1243). 
Other challengers were guided by self-transcendent values 
(Jansson & Biel 2011) such as social justice and fairness. 
Executives have also been blamed for excessive risk-taking to 
optimise their stock option income at the expense of 
shareholders (Burns & Kedia 2006; Ertimur et al. 2011).
The effectiveness of shareholder 
activists as change agents
In one of the first studies on the impact of shareholder activism 
on executive remuneration, Thomas and Martin (1999) 
investigated 168 shareholder proposals submitted to 145 US 
companies over the period 1993–1997. They noted that 
boards responded by lowering their CEO pay levels and 
package composition. Challengers tended to target poorly 
performing companies that exhibited higher levels of 
executive compensation in comparison to their industry 
peers. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) confirmed a 
negative relationship between total direct compensation and 
the concentration of active institutional shareholders among 
US companies in the 1990s. Direct compensation included 
salaries, bonuses, options and stock grants, long-term 
incentive plans and other sources of compensation. In 2004, 
shareholder activists targeted more than 150 US companies to 
adopt fair value accounting for employee stock options. In the 
cases where shareholders approved these proposals, the level 
of CEO compensation decreased along with the stock options 
that were used to reward these CEOs (Ferri & Sandino 2009).
In line with previous researchers, Ertimur et al. (2011) 
investigated 1198 shareholder proposals on executive 
emolument in the US. These authors, however, also assessed 
the outcomes of 134 ‘just vote no’ campaigns over the period 
1997–2007. Their findings concurred with those of Kimbro 
and Zu (2016) who showed that shareholder activists’ efforts 
resulted in remuneration committees reducing excessive 
CEO pay. Contrasting findings were reported by Conyon 
and Sadler (2010) who investigated ‘just vote no’ campaigns 
in the UK from 2002 to 2007. They reported little evidence 
that CEO pay was substantially lower in companies that 
were previously targeted. This finding could be partly 
explained by Cai, Garner and Walkling’s (2010) observation 
that ‘say on pay’ campaigns were often used to focus on 
large, visible companies and not necessarily on those with 
excessive CEO pay.
Instead of analysing voting outcomes, Bauer, Moers and Viehs 
(2015) studied the extent to which shareholders withdrew 
their proposals prior to a company’s annual general meeting 
(AGM). Their sample included 12 000 shareholder proposals 
filed to Standard & Poor’s 1500 companies between 1997 and 
2009. Proposals were usually withdrawn when shareholders 
were satisfied with the management’s response to their 
questions or the commitments made to transform. Withdrawn 
proposals on executive compensation were associated with 
subsequent amendments to pay practices.
Whereas the previously mentioned studies focused on 
shareholder proposals and voting as public voice activism 
mechanisms, Core et al. (2008) investigated the role of the 
press in shaping executive remuneration in the US. These 
authors considered more than 11 000 press articles on CEO 
compensation over the period 1994–2002. They noted that 
the press coverage was related to company size and large 
option exercises. However, they found no evidence that 
negative reporting motivated the considered companies 
to change their executive compensation practices. In a 
European context, Hooghiemstra et al. (2015) observed that 
negative press coverage of CEO pay packages predicted 
shareholder discontent and subsequent ‘say on pay’ votes. 
Their study highlighted the important role of the press in 
promoting corporate governance, including responsible 
compensation practices.
As indicated earlier, the majority of studies on executive 
remuneration in South Africa have focused on the relationship 
between executive pay and company performance. As this 
link is not always clear, shareholders and other challengers 
have become increasingly critical of local companies’ 
executive pay policies and practices (Viviers 2015). It is 
essential that shareholders monitor executive pay packages 
(Bussin 2015b), especially as executives have considerable 
power to influence their own pay (Bussin 2015a). In addition 
to total pay, Bussin (2015a) suggested that pertinent attention 
should be given to the components of executives’ emolument 
packages. Given that the agency theory is the prominent 
theoretical lens in activism literature (Goranova & Ryan 2014), 
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the focus of this study was on ‘say on pay’ activism. The 
authors acknowledge that executive emolument could be 
an instrument to address the principal-agent problem, but 
could also be part of the problem (Bebchuk & Fried 2003). 
The relationships between public shareholder activism and 
various executive pay components were thus investigated. 
Given their negotiation power and growing public scrutiny, 
focus was specifically placed on CEO compensation.
In line with Core et al. (2008), the following research 
hypotheses were formulated:
H0,1: There is no relationship between public ‘say on pay’ activism 
and changes in the total pay of targeted executives.
H0,2: There is no relationship between public ‘say on pay’ activism 
and changes in the bonuses and other performance-based 
incentives of targeted executives.
H0,3: Public ‘say on pay’ activism does not have a larger effect on 
the total pay of CEOs than non-CEOs.
H0,4: Public ‘say on pay’ activism does not have a larger effect on 
the bonuses and other performance-based incentives of CEOs 
than non-CEOs.
Research methods
This descriptive study firstly focused on the nature of local 
entities that were publicly criticised for their executive 
remuneration policies and practices over the period 01 January 
2010 to 31 December 2016. Focus was also placed on the main 
challengers in the social movement, the key issues raised and 
the impact that the challengers had on the targeted entities’ 
executive remuneration policies and practices.
An Excel database was created to capture data from relevant 
online newspaper articles. The required data were hence 
available in the public domain. Keywords and phrases were 
used to identify articles from three prominent South African 
finance publications, namely Fin24, Business Day and 
Moneyweb. The keywords and phrases were: shareholder 
engagement, public shareholder activism, shareholder 
concern(s), shareholder discontent, proxy voting, wage gap, 
executive remuneration, cash bonus(es), performance-based 
incentive(s), AGM, shareholder meeting and ordinary 
resolution. Keywords also included the names of well-known 
local shareholder activists such as Theo Botha, Chris Logan, 
David Couldridge and the Public Investment Corporation 
(PIC). As the press cannot be considered a homogeneous 
information source in predicting shareholders’ ‘say on pay’ 
voting behaviour (Hooghiemstra et al. 2015), a decision was 
made to exclude articles that appeared in the general press.
The following data were captured: the name of the targeted 
JSE-listed company or SOE, name of the targeted executive, 
name of the shareholder activist, name of the newspaper 
featuring the article, the publishing date of the article and 
the activist’s specific concerns. Only articles featuring 
activists’ apprehensions about executive remuneration were 
included, whether raised at a shareholder meeting or during 
an interview with a journalist. Different newspapers often 
reported the same criticism levelled against a particular 
executive or company. In such cases, only the most complete 
article was considered. To ensure the accurate classification 
of topics, two of the authors compared their individual 
classifications with each other.
A total of 92 events were identified involving 65 executives. 
Most of these individuals were only targeted once or twice 
during the entire research period. In some articles mention 
was only made of ‘executives’ without revealing their 
names. Data on the two dependent variables (total pay, and 
bonuses and other performance-based incentives) were 
then downloaded for each of the targeted executives in 
the year when they were criticised and one year later. The 
latter enabled the authors to determine the impact that 
the challengers had on changing executive remuneration 
policies and practices. Although Core et al. (2008) included 
stock options in their study, insufficient data were available 
on share options for South African executives. All values 
were recorded in South African rand at financial year end. 
Values were adjusted for inflation using South Africa’s 
Consumer Price Index average for each year of the research 
period.
In line with Core et al. (2008), the following control variables 
were considered: company size (log of total assets) and 
company performance (as reflected by the total revenue and 
earnings before interest and tax). Data on the dependent 
and control variables were downloaded from Bloomberg 
L.P. (2018) for the 38 JSE-listed companies and manually 
recorded for the five SOEs based on their published financial 
statements. Data were also captured on the industry in 
which a listed company operated (using the Global Industry 
Classification Standard) and whether the company was a 
constituent of the Top 100 and FTSE/JSE RI indices in the 
year that it was targeted. To test H0,3 and H0,4, a one (1) was 
allocated for targeted executives who were CEOs, and a 
zero (0) for those who were not.
An inductive process was followed to identify the main 
categories of challengers and remuneration-related concerns 
that were raised during the research process. This form of 
content analysis was deemed appropriate as there are, as far as 
could be ascertained, no previous studies on the phenomenon 
in the local context (Elo & Kyngäs 2007). Descriptive statistics 
were computed to evaluate trends in the data, whereas mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were used to 
examine the research hypotheses. To ensure their anonymity, 
no names of the targeted companies, SOEs or executives were 
reported in this article.
Ethical considerations
Stellenbosch University’s Research Ethics Committee 
(Humanities) granted ethical clearance for this project on 18 
June 2018 (project and clearance number: REC-2018-6925). As 
no humans were involved in the study, the ethical risks 
associated with the project were deemed to be minimal.
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Results
The results are discussed according to the four research 
objectives proposed earlier.
The nature of entities being targeted
The executive remuneration policies and practices of the 
following five SOEs were publicly criticised at some point 
during the research period: the national electricity provider 
(ESKOM), the national broadcaster (SABC), PetroSA, 
Transnet and the South African National Roads Agency 
(SANRAL). Executives at 38 JSE-listed companies were 
targeted, including those at Telkom. Although this provider 
of fixed-line, mobile, data and information technology 
services is listed on the local bourse, the South African 
government owns the majority of its issued ordinary 
shares.
Most of the listed companies did business in the financial 
(33.7%) and materials industries (16.3%). Labour unrest in 
the mining industry could be partly blamed on the widening 
wage gap between mining executives and other employees 
(Bussin 2018; Seccombe 2013). A few of the targeted 
companies (12.5%) had their primary listings on stock 
exchanges other than the JSE, notably in London. This 
distinction is important as a London-based listing might 
imply that executives are compensated in pound sterling 
rather than in South African rand. At an exchange rate 
fluctuating between R15 and R20 to the pound, these 
executives’ packages might seem exorbitant in local terms, 
but they are quite in line with those of their UK peers.
The vast majority of the targeted companies (73.68%) ranked 
among the 100 largest JSE-listed companies. This finding is 
not surprising as previous researchers have also noted that 
large companies are more likely to be targeted than small 
ones (Core et al. 2008). According to Brandes, Goranova and 
Hall (2008) and Ferri and Sandino (2009), activist campaigns 
involving large companies have a better chance of capturing 
public and media attention, thus facilitating spillover effects. 
These authors argue that non-targeted companies tend to 
address contentious issues to avoid similar, potentially 
damaging public criticism.
Half of the targeted companies were constituents of the FTSE/
JSE RI Index. The authors expected a smaller percentage of 
constituents to be targeted, as these companies are supposedly 
responsible corporate citizens. It was thus anticipated that 
their executive remuneration policies and practices would be 
more transparent and socially justifiable.
Challengers in the ‘say on pay’ movement
Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of activists 
who raised their executive remuneration-related concerns in 
public.
As expected, the largest group of challengers consisted of 
individual and minority shareholders. These shareholders 
generally do not have access to corporate decision-makers 
and are hence forced to ask questions at shareholder meetings 
or speak to journalists. The most vocal activists in this 
category were Theo Botha, Chris Logan, Roy McAlpine and 
Albie Cilliers. It is encouraging that more asset managers 
are articulating their ‘say on pay’ concerns in public. Their 
visible approach might be due to private engagements that 
were unsuccessful. This claim, however, calls for further 
investigation.
Given the nature of the investigated topic, it came as no 
surprise that trade unions were important challengers. As 
large asset owners, they have an important monitoring role 
and responsibility to voice concerns regarding fair emolument 
on behalf of their members. Trade unions have long been 
regarded as social movements in themselves as they strive to 
promote fairness in labour markets (Masiya 2014; Watson 
2007). The involvement of challengers who do not have a 
financial interest in the targeted companies (such as 
politicians and thought leaders) might be ascribed to their 
desire to bring about a more just society. The freedom to 
openly express their views could be construed as a sign of a 
healthy democracy.
Prominent executive remuneration-related 
issues raised by challengers
As illustrated in Table 2, most of the ‘say on pay’ concerns 
related to the size of executives’ total pay, bonuses and other 
performance-based incentives.
Almost 30% of public outcries by challengers related to 
insufficient or lacking justifications for the size or composition 
of executives’ emolument packages. Challengers were 
particularly critical of companies that increased their 
executives’ total pay, bonuses and other performance-based 
TABLE 1: Number of ‘say on pay’ events based on activist type.
Type of activist 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Individual and minority shareholders† 6 4 6 1 10 9 10 46
Asset managers‡ 1 1 - 2 1 5 9 19
Trade unions§ 2 - 3 - 1 1 4 11
Politicians - 4 - - - - 6 10
Others¶ 2 - - - - - 3 5
Total 11 9 9 3 12 16 32 92
†, Reference was often only made to minority shareholders without citing names; ‡, Asset managers who raised their concerns in public included the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), Mergence 
Investment Managers, Allan Gray, Element Investment Managers, Aeon Investment Management, Old Mutual and Prudential Asset Managers; §, Trade unions that featured in this study included 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and the South African 
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union (SACCAWU); ¶, This category included a pension fund consultant, a thought leadership organisation, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
(IODSA), the Black Management Forum and an investor interest group. 
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incentives while financial performance stagnated or declined. 
This finding corroborates prior research in the international 
context (Cai & Walkling 2011; Core 2008; Ferri & Sandino 
2009). Several activists also requested greater clarity on the 
metrics and time frames that are used to determine (and 
hence justify) performance-based incentives.
The effectiveness of activists as change agents
The mixed-model analysis of variance test results for the first 
two hypotheses are shown in Table 3.
H0,1 could be rejected in light of the significant positive 
relationship observed between the variables. The average 
annual total pay of executives decreased from R30 200 583 to 
R26 545 361 after being publicly targeted. The positive 
relationship between public ‘say on pay’ activism and 
change in the bonuses and other performance-based incentives of 
executives meant that H0,2 could also be rejected. The average 
annual monetary value of these compensation elements fell 
from R15 234 711 to R10 580 657 in the year after being 
targeted. These findings highlight the important monitoring 
role that shareholders and other challengers play in promoting 
fair and responsible executive remuneration in South Africa.
Almost two-thirds of the targeted executives (64.45%) were 
CEOs. This finding was expected. Other scholars also noted 
that these individuals experience more public scrutiny, given 
that they usually earn more than other directors (Nordén & 
Strand 2011). The statistics did not reveal that public ‘say on 
pay’ activism had a larger effect on the total pay (H0,3) or bonuses 
and other performance-based incentives (H0,4) of CEOs compared 
to non-CEOs (CEOs: F(2,710) = 0.543; p = 0.583 and non-CEOs: 
F(2,761) = 2.086; p = 0.131). Although the majority of CEOs 
earned more than their non-CEO counterparts and were 
targeted more frequently during the study period, it does 
not seem as if the remuneration committees differentiated 
between CEOs and non-CEOs when adjusting pay packages. 
Challengers might have focused their attention on CEOs to 
make a statement about executive remuneration in general, 
and not only on the individuals in question. In light of the 
managerial power theory, it could be argued that although 
shareholders recognise the considerable power of CEOs in 
influencing remuneration policies and practices, remuneration 
committees are not as sensitive about the matter.
Conclusions and recommendations
Executive remuneration remains a controversial topic and 
regularly features in newspaper headlines. Despite a 
growing body of literature on shareholder activism and 
executive remuneration, few studies have considered the 
intersection between these fields. Most local studies focused 
on the pay-performance link, composition of executive 
remuneration packages and pay benchmarking. This study 
is the first of its kind in that it adopts a social movement 
perspective and offers empirical evidence on the targets, 
challengers, themes and the impact of public ‘say on pay’ 
activism in South Africa.
The first research objective called for the identification of the 
local entities that were targeted by ‘say on pay’ activists over 
the research period 2010–2016. A rigorous data collection 
process revealed that five large SOEs and 38 JSE-listed 
companies were publicly scrutinised. In line with the extant 
literature, most of these targets were large, well-known 
companies.
The research furthermore centred on identifying and 
categorising the key challengers in the local ‘say on pay’ 
social movement. As expected, individual and minority 
shareholders represented the largest category of challengers, 
followed by asset managers and trade unions. As individual 
and minority shareholders generally do not have access to 
TABLE 3: Mixed-model analysis of variance test results for H0,1 and H0,2.





H0,1: There is no relationship between public ‘say on pay’ activism and changes in the total pay of 
targeted executives. 
Time 2 166 3.53 0.031*
H0,2: There is no relationship between public ‘say on pay’ activism and changes in the bonuses and 
other performance-based incentives of targeted executives. 
Time 2 78 4.90 0.001**
*, Significant at the 95% confidence level; **, Significant at the 99% confidence level.
TABLE 2: Categories summarising challengers’ executive remuneration-related 
concerns.
Main concern Sub-category concerns N %





Size of total pay package 54 20.69
Size of bonus and other performance-based incentives 38 14.56
The growing wage gap 8 3.07
Level of fixed pay 5 1.92
Rate of change of pay 5 1.92






Justification of remuneration in light of poor company 
performance
32 12.26
Justification of bonus in light of poor company 
performance
18 6.90
Unsatisfactory link between executive pay and 
company performance
9 3.45
Justification of remuneration packages in general 12 4.60




Transparency Lack of disclosure on performance-based pay 18 6.90
Inaccurate disclosure of bonuses 13 4.98
Lack of disclosure of compensation policy 11 4.21
Lack of transparency on total pay 7 2.68




Excessive use of stock options and shares 7 2.68
Retirement benefits 4 1.53
Overreliance on short-term performance such as 
bonuses
4 1.53
Vesting period of stock options 2 0.77
Total 17 6.51
Total 261 100
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boardrooms, they have no choice but to raise their concerns 
in public. It is a pity that only a handful of individual and 
minority shareholders actively speak out. Shareholders of all 
sizes are encouraged to take a more public stance on executive 
remuneration as their efforts could just be what is required to 
promote fair and responsible executive remuneration.
The third research objective focused on the key ‘say on pay’ 
issues raised in the press. The vast majority of concerns centred 
on the size and composition of executive pay packages. 
Insufficient communication by remuneration committees, 
especially in cases where companies increased their executives’ 
pay despite poor company performance, also featured 
prominently. The empirical evidence in this study showed 
that some shareholders did not view executive compensation 
as a means of addressing the agency problem, but rather as a 
contributing factor. Challengers who do not have a direct 
financial stake in the targeted companies might be raising their 
concerns on broader social grounds. This argument is bolstered 
by the finding that most of the targeted executives were 
CEOs. As supported by Kidder and Buchholtz (2002), these 
individuals play a major role in creating trust, both within and 
beyond their organisations. Seemingly excessive compensation 
could thus be detrimental not only to their own reputation, but 
also to their companies’ reputation. By targeting figureheads, 
challengers in this study addressed executive pay in general, 
rather than focusing on specific cases.
The authors also investigated the impact that challengers 
had on the targeted executives’ remuneration. The statistics 
showed that total pay, and bonuses and other performance-
based incentives decreased significantly in the year following 
negative press coverage. No differences in decreases were 
observed between CEOs and non-CEOs.
The findings suggest that public ‘say on pay’ activism 
could be effective in addressing the large and growing 
wage gap in South Africa. The authors acknowledge that 
private engagement might have a significant impact on the 
decisions of remuneration committees. Given that private 
correspondence and negotiations between institutional 
investors and companies are typically confidential, scholars 
do not have access to data on the nature and effectiveness of 
these engagements. The empirical evidence could nonetheless 
encourage shareholders of all sizes to take a stronger public 
stance on seemingly excessive and poorly justified executive 
pay packages.
The findings contradict claims that requests by individual 
shareholders, or ‘gadflies’ as they are known in the US, ‘waste 
managerial time and cost firms millions of dollars’ (Gantchev & 
Giannetti 2019:1). The evidence also refutes allegations 
that these shareholders only seek ‘fame’ by questioning 
and criticising directors at AGMs (Nordén & Strand 2011). 
A growing number of remuneration committees of local 
entities might be more attentive to these challengers as 
they realise the importance of preserving their company’s 
reputation and subsequent ability to attract capital, consumers 
and employees in a relatively small market.
Given the empirical evidence, a number of recommendations 
are offered. Remuneration committees of South African 
SOEs and listed companies should take cognisance of the 
growing ‘say on pay’ movement. They could avoid 
damaging publicity by improving their reporting, especially 
pertaining to the metrics they use to determine bonuses and 
other performance-based incentives. This recommendation 
is made despite claims that increased disclosure could result 
in pay benchmarking and an upward spiral in total executive 
compensation (Cadman & Carter 2014). Shareholders, 
trade unions and other stakeholders are entitled to more 
transparent explanations of seemingly excessive remuneration. 
This recommendation is particularly apt in cases where an 
entity’s wage gap is far in excess of the industry or national 
average. In a country plagued by inequality, ‘say on pay’ 
clearly extends beyond discussions on addressing the 
agency problem, as it effectively touches on the moral fibre 
of society. Remuneration committees should ideally engage 
with institutional investors prior to AGMs to inform them 
about relevant matters and clarify questions that they might 
have.
Scholars could extend this pioneering research by including 
expression of discontent made via social media. It is expected 
that a growing number of stakeholders will use this platform 
in future to convey their discontent. More research is also 
required on best practices for report details on executive pay 
policies and practices. Challengers should be emboldened by 
the fact that public ‘say on pay’ activism not only raises 
awareness of key issues, but that it can effectively reduce the 
total executive pay, bonuses and other performance-based 
incentives. Shareholders of all sizes and other concerned 
parties are thus encouraged to make greater use of their 
democratic right to speak out freely: Viva ‘say on pay’ 
democracy in South Africa!
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